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Religious persecution manifests itself in various harmful ways. Traditional intervention 
strategies are useful but limited. The article explores the need to reinforce the combating 
of religious persecution with the increased use of international justice mechanisms. In 
particular, the article studies how the crime against humanity of persecution can be used 
to hold religious persecutors accountable under international criminal law.  
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The word “persecution” immediately conjures up images of early Christians being torn 
apart by wild beasts before cheering crowds in Rome’s Colosseum. This happened during 
the reign of Emperor Diocletian, during which a two-decades-long massacre accounted 
for almost half of all martyrdoms in the early Church.2 Throughout the last 2 000 years, 
persecution on religious grounds has manifested itself across the world until the present 
day. In July 2013 Amnesty International (AI) published a report which shows that Egypt’s 
Coptic Christians are subjected to unending “discrimination by the authorities and receive 
inadequate protection from the state from sectarian violence, when not targeted directly 
by security forces.”33 Many Coptic churches have been closed down or destroyed for 
allegedly failing to obtain official consent to operate. Another current example is the reign 
of terror conducted by Boko Haram, a Salafi-jihadi Muslim group operating mainly in 
north-eastern Nigeria and which is accused of killing numerous Christian worshippers 
and assassinating Muslims opposed to it.4 
  
In August 2013 the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
issued a report stating that from the available information, there is a reasonable basis to 
believe that since July 2009, Boko Haram has committed the crimes of (1) murder 
constituting a crime against humanity under article 7(1) (a) of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) Statute and (2) persecution constituting a crime against humanity under 
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article 7(1) (h) of the ICC Statute.5 
 
At the time of writing, the Office of the Prosecutor has advanced the preliminary 
examination to establish whether the situation meets the criteria established by the ICC 
Statute to warrant an investigation by the ICC.6  
 
This article studies religious persecution in relation to the emerging body of international 
criminal law, which penalizes the crime against humanity of persecution. It looks at how 
the campaign to uphold the right to freedom of religion or belief can be reinforced by 
resorting to international criminal law which, as Thomuschat puts it, “embodies the new 
quality of international law, which is no longer limited to the rules of true interstate 
matters, but reaches deep into the state’s domestic sphere.”7 
 
1. Coming to grips with the meaning of persecution  
In recent years, a vast body of literature on the topic of religious persecution has come 
into existence. However, in the absence of a universally accepted definition of religious 
persecution, the notion of persecution means different things to different people or 
groups against whom states implement discriminatory policies. It would be mistaken, as 
Tieszen points out, to think of persecution as a “strictly violent act that may end in 
martyrdom” or as “all forms of suffering”.8 For example, in 2007 a German family of 
Bissingen who had sought to home school their children on religious grounds were 
heavily fined and had their children forcibly placed in schools by the police. As a result, 
the family left Germany and applied for political asylum in the United States. Their 
application was granted by a United States Federal Immigration judge on the grounds 
that the “German government was persecuting them on account of their religious 
convictions.”9 In issuing his order, the judge went on to say that “this particular policy of 
persecuting homeschoolers is repellent to everything” that Americans believe.10 Another 
example of how persecution has been interpreted, is the fact that prior to a seminal 
judgement handed down by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in 2012, 
there was a tendency amongst European courts to reject applications for asylum for 
religious reasons on the grounds that applicants could avoid persecution if they practised 
their religion privately and secretly in their home country. 
 
In its September 2012 ruling the CJEU rejected the narrow construction placed by 
national courts on religious freedom, according to which asylum was granted only in cases 
of extreme persecution, meaning that only where people’s affiliation to a religion exposed 
them to the risk of incurring physical harm. Instead, the CJEU held,1111 thus binding all 
courts in the European Union, that the curtailment of the right to manifest one’s religion 
in public justifies the granting of refugee status, if the competent authorities reasonably 
                                                 
5 Ibid 30. 
6 Ibid. 
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think that the applicant will on his return to his country of origin engage in religious 
practices that will expose him to a real risk of persecution, and the fact that he could avoid 
that risk by abstaining from certain religious practices is, in principle, irrelevant.12 
 
2. Interventions on behalf of the persecuted  
Resorting to the law to obtain relief against religious persecution is an avenue open only 
to those who can gain or are allowed access to the courts. The drawback here is that legal 
proceedings are expensive and can be protracted. Also, a persecuting state is most 
unlikely to grant legal aid to an indigent person who is the very target of its persecution 
policy. Christine Schirrmacher writes that although Sharia law explicitly requires that an 
apostate be visited with the death penalty, in practice the sentence is rarely executed, 
though this cannot be ruled out in certain countries. 13  A loyal Muslim who kills an 
apostate even before he repents or is tried by a court, will only very rarely be charged with 
murder himself, meaning that he may do so with impunity.14 
 
Effective recourse to the law presupposes that accused persons or complainants will be 
guaranteed a fair hearing. This means, among other things, that the court is independent 
of political interference, that accused persons or complainants have a right to approach 
the courts and a right to appoint counsel of their choice, that they have a right to a public 
hearing, a right to call witnesses and to cross-examine the witnesses of the opposing 
party, a right to take a decision on appeal, and a right to have a judicial decision in their 
favour enforced by the law. In practice, Saudi Arabia, for example, adopted a Basic Law in 
1992 which does not provide for freedom of religion, freedom of speech and expression, 
equality before the law, fair trial rights, the right to the physical inviolability of the person, 
and the right to freedom of association and assembly.15 These are precisely the rights that 
need to be asserted where the freedom to manifest one’s faith is curtailed or penalised. It 
is exasperating for the victim of religious persecution where the persecuting state 
theoretically subscribes to upholding international norms regarding the protection of 
religious minorities, and where such norms have been incorporated into law, but where in 
practice, judges interpret and apply such norms subject to the whims of the Executive. 
 
In his case studies from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Sudan,16 Eltayeb points out that until 
General Zia assumed power in Pakistan in the 1970s, Pakistani judges based their 
judgments on the country’s 1956 and 1962 constitutions, embracing in their decisions 
international norms of freedom of religion as well as Islamic legal texts supporting the 
protection of religious minorities. However, with Zia’s ascent to head of state, “an 
Islamization process has encroached on the independence of the judiciary and 
undermined its role in protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, 
including the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion or belief.” 17  The 
independence of the Sudanese judiciary, too, was similarly compromised in the early 
                                                 
12 At para 79. 
13 “Defection from Islam in context: A disturbing human rights dilemma” (2010) 3 IJRF 13 at 29. 
14 Ibid 30. 
15 See International Commission of Jurists’ Submission to the UN Human Rights Council (2-13 February 2009) available at 
lib.ohchr.org/.../ICJ_SAU_UPR_S4_2009_TheInternationalCommission.   
16 M.S.M. Eltayeb A human rights approach to combating religious persecution (2001, INTERSENTIA) 191.  
17 Ibid 196. For more recent examples of harsh penalties imposed by Pakistani judges for alleged blasphemous conduct, see A. 
Buwalda and G. Yogarajah “No justice for minorities in Pakistan” (2011) 4 IJRF 101 at 103-105. 
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1980s, following President Nimeiri’s assumption of power. 18  In both countries, the 
persecution intensified, namely the case of the apostate Ahmadiyya in Pakistan and the 
Republican Brothers in Sudan, showing how the judiciary could be manipulated to reach 
decisions in violation of constitutional norms.19 
 
3. Interventions by United Nations bodies 
At present, there are four treaty-based bodies charged with supervising the interpretation 
and application of the right to freedom of religion. They are: The UN Council for Human 
Rights; the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and the Committee on the Rights of the Child. In 
practice, these bodies perform a salutary task but with limited success. This is due to the 
fact that the committees are comprised mostly of persons who are not necessarily 
appointed on the basis of their competence, but on the “lobbying effectiveness of the 
nominee’s country’s representative at the UN, bloc voting and general diplomatic 
bargaining”.2020 They meet only twice or thrice a year, and only for a few weeks, and are 
under-resourced and dependent on the UN for their budgets. They lack independent fact-
finding and investigative capacity, hold no oral or public hearings and cannot cross-
examine witnesses or experts. They further lack the authority to enforce their views which 
“states frequently ignore”; and they are not vested with powers to hold states accountable 
which fail or refuse to submit compliance reports.21 
 
Besides the abovementioned committees, there is the office of the UN Special Rapporteur 
on freedom of religion or belief which was created in 1986 to look into violations of the 
1981 UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination 
Based on Religion or Belief.22 The Special Rapporteur performs a more hands-on job than 
the committees, for the work entails conducting actual country visits during which the 
incumbent speaks directly to victims, their families, human rights activists, 
representatives from faith groups, government, parliament and the courts.23 
 
The Special Rapporteur is able to respond speedily to a complaint, an allegation or an 
urgent appeal, regardless from whom it emanates, and does not have to wait until all the 
basic facts are at hand or until the complainant has first exhausted all the available 
national remedies. The Rapporteur first communicates with the responsible government 
confidentially through diplomatic channels, but after an average period of two months – 
except in urgent matters – the letters of complaint or appeal, including the reply or 
silence of the government concerned, are publicly made known to the UN Human Rights 
Council and are posted on the website of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights.24 
 
The Special Rapporteur’s mandate is not treaty-based, which means complaints and 
appeals can be dealt with from victims of religious persecutions throughout the world, 
                                                 
18 Eltayeb note 16 above 196. 
19 Ibid 197. 
20 G. Robertson Crimes against humanity 3rd ed (2006, Penguin) 62-63.  
21 Ibid. 
22 Adopted by the UN General Assembly on 18 January 1982 [UN Doc.A/RES/36/55 (1981)]. 
23 “Protecting and implementing the right to freedom of religion or belief: Interview with Heiner Bielefeld” available at 




and not only from those in states that have ratified specific treaties and have accepted the 
optional complaints procedures or protocols. This flexible man date also enables the 
Special Rapporteur to respond to intra-religious persecutions, which are not covered by 
any of the UN treaties, but which in a wider context engage the right to freedom of 
thought, expression, religion or belief.25  
 
 The Special Rapporteur is therefore better positioned to intervene more meaningfully 
and more expressively than the UN committees mentioned above. A drawback of the 
Rapporteur’s work is that he visits a country only when it invites him, which reduces his 
oversight to spot checks. While the Rapporteur admittedly lacks judicial authority and, at 
best, can make only unenforceable recommendations, these drawbacks are compensated 
for by quick responses, face-to-face encounters with all parties concerned, constructive 
dialogue, and a high-level publicity of the situation. However, as in the case of all special 
rapporteurs, there is a need to create procedures that allow for a follow-up visit to the 
country in question. The present lack of such follow-up missions is a weakness. 
 
For all their limitations, the bodies mentioned above perform a vital function. There is no 
one-size-fits-all method of combating religious persecution, for each situation calls for a 
particular response or combination of responses. One such response, to which the 
discussion now turns, is making more use of international criminal law to hold religious 
persecutors accountable at law. 
 
4. Persecution as an international crime  
4.1 Genesis and evolution of the crime  
The term “crime against humanity” was first coined in 1915, following the massacre of 
Armenian Christians in Turkey. Britain, Russia and France issued a joint statement, 
threatening post-war retribution, and announcing that all those involved would be 
personally liable “for new crimes...against humanity and civilization.”26 
 
However, nothing came of this, partly because the trials, in which only a few were 
convicted, were conducted in weak military courts which left no recorded judgments,27 
and partly because of the sudden post-war series of victories by Turkish armies under the 
command of Kemal Atatürk.28 It was only after the persecution and genocide of another 
religious minority in the 1930s and 1940s, namely the European Jews, that crimes against 
humanity were first explicitly formulated in the Nuremberg Charter and punished as a 
crime by the Nuremberg Tribunal. Article 6 of the Charter defined crimes against 
humanity as acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, and 
included crimes such as murder, extermination, enslavement or political, racial and 
religious persecutions. 
 
The Nuremberg trial itself set a colossal precedent in international law when in its 
judgment, the tribunal held in a famous passage that “[c]rimes against international law 
are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who 
                                                 
25 See Eltayeb note 16 above at 205.   
26 J.F. Willis Prologue to Nuremberg (1982, Greenwood Press) 26.   
27 Robertson note 20 above at 22.  
28 MacCulloch note 2 above at 924. 
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commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.”29 This means 
that today international crimes can be committed by state officials as well as by private 
persons.30 
 
No further trials involving the prosecution of crimes against humanity were held during 
the Cold War period, which was marked by some of the most appalling atrocities 
perpetrated in wars and under tyrannical heads of state. It was not until the 1990s, after 
the tragic genocide that almost wiped out the Tutsi population of Rwanda, and the 
execution of 7 000 Muslims in Srebrenica, that the crime of religious persecution as a 
crime against humanity was tried by an international tribunal. 
 
4.2 Persecution under the Statutes of the International Tribunal for the 
Former  
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)  
“Persecution” is included in Article 5 of the ICTY Statute and Article 3 of the ICTR 
Statute. The provisions permit the prosecution of persons for the “seizure or destruction 
or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion” as a war crime,31  and as 
genocide when the acts are “committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part,…a 
religious group.”32  Both Statutes authorize the prosecution of people responsible for 
religious persecution as a crime against humanity.33 However, as the formulations in both 
the ICTY and ICTR Statutes merely characterise “persecution” as a specific crime, without 
defining the term further, the task of elaborating the definition has been left largely to the 
ICTY and ICTR tribunals. 
 
In one of the first cases tried by the ICTY, the Tadić case, in which the accused was 
charged with the crime of religious persecution as a crime against humanity, the Trial 
Chamber held that persecution “encompasses a variety of acts, including, inter alia, those 
of a physical, economic or judicial nature, that violate an individual’s right to the equal 
enjoyment of his basic rights.”34 Endorsing the view that persecution “can consist of the 
deprivation of a wide variety of rights” the ICTY Trial Chamber, in its judgement in 
Prosecutor v Kupreškić et al stated furthermore, that persecutory acts need not be 
expressly prohibited in the ICTY Statute, and that it is irrelevant whether or not such acts 
are legal under national laws.35 In the Matrić trial, the ICTY Chamber defined persecution 
as a crime against humanity as an act or omission which (1) discriminates in fact and 
which denies or infringes upon fundamental rights as provided in international 
customary or treaty law and (2) was carried out deliberately with the intention to 
discriminate on political, racial or religious grounds.36 
                                                                                                                                                                
 
29 IMT, Judgement of 1 October 1946, in The Trial of German major war criminals. Proceedings of the International Military 
Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, Germany Part 22 (1950) 447.  
30 Prosecutor v Kunarac et al ICTY Case No. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1- T Judgement of 22 February 2001 at para 494. See also G. 
Mettraux International crimes and the AD HOC tribunals (2006, Oxford) 277; A. Bianchi “State responsibility and criminal 
liability of individuals’ in A. Cassese (ed.) The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (2009, Oxford) 16-17.  
31 Art. 3 (d) ICTY Statute. 
32 Ibid art. 4 (2) read with art. 4 (3); art. 2(2) read with art. 3 ICTR Statute. 
33 Art. 5(h) ICTY Statute; art. 3(h) ICTR Statute.   
34 Prosecutor v Tadić ICTY Case No. IT-94-I-T, Judgement of 7 May, 1997 at para 710. 
35 Prosecutor v Kupreškić et al ICTY Case No. IT-95-16-A, Judgement of 14 January 2000 at para 614. 
36 Prosecutor v Matrić ICTY Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement of 12 June 2007 at para 113. See also Prosecutor v Kupreškić et al 
note 35 above at para 621; Prosecutor v Krnojelac ICTY Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgement of 15 March 2002 at para 431; 




What distinguishes persecution from other crimes against humanity is that in the case of 
persecution, the mental element of the crime must be the conscious intent to commit the 
underlying crime or act on a discriminatory basis.37 The perpetrator must act with the 
specific intent to discriminate38 on political, racial or religious grounds, and this intent 
must be aimed at a group, rather than an individual, as the mental element requirement 
“is the specific intent to cause injury to a human being because he belongs to a particular 
community or group.”39 
 
As regards the material elements (the conduct) of the crime, there is no exhaustive list of 
acts that may constitute persecution. The ICTY has expanded the definition of persecution 
to include other persecutory acts outside those specifically enumerated in the ICTY 
Statute. These other acts must be equivalent in gravity to the other crimes against 
humanity listed in Article 5 of the ICTY Statute, 40  namely murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, and other inhumane acts. To 
meet the equal gravity test these other acts must constitute a denial or violation of a 
fundamental right laid down in international customary law41 and must be determined on 
a “fact-specific inquiry.”42 
 
Both the ICTR and ICTY Tribunals have identified, among others, the following acts as 
persecution: participation in attacks on civilians, including indiscriminate attacks on 
cities, towns, and villages; as well as the seizure, collection, segregation, and forced 
transfer of civilians to camps; calling-out of civilians; beatings; forms of sexual assault; 
such attacks on property as would constitute a destruction of the livelihood of a certain 
population; destruction or wilful damage to religious and cultural buildings; or the 
destruction and plunder of property where this is serious enough, either by reason of its 
magnitude or because of the value of the stolen property or the nature and extent of the 
destruction; unlawful detention of civilians, and serious bodily and mental harm.43 The 
withdrawal of voting rights may be regarded as persecution, 44 and under certain 
circumstances, “hate speech” can also constitute persecution.45 
 
The conduct is discriminatory when the victim is targeted because of his or her 
membership, or imputed membership,46  in a group defined by the perpetrator on a 
                                                 
37 Prosecutor v Kupreškić et al note 35 above at para 607; Prosecutor v Stakić ICTY Case No. IT-97-24-A, Judgement of 22 March 
2006 at para 323; Prosecutor v Simić et al ICTY Case No. IT- 95-9-A, Judgement of 28 November 2006 at para 86.  
38 Prosecutor v Blaškić ICTY Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgement of 29 July 2004 at para 164; Prosecutor v Stakić note 37 above at 
para 328; Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez ICTY Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgement of 17 December 2004 at para 111.  
39 Prosecutor v Kordić and Ćerkez note 38 above at para 111; Prosecutor v Matrić note 36 above at Para 120. 
40 Mettraux note 30 above at 178; Prosecutor v Krnojelac note 36 above at para 435. Prosecutor v Krnojelac note 36 above at para 
221.  
41 Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez note 38 above at para 103; Prosecutor v Blaškić note 38 above at para 139. 
42 Prosecutor v Stanišić and Źupljanin ICTY Case No. IT-08-91-T, Judgement of 27 March 2013 at para 70; Prosecutor v Brđanin 
ICTY Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgement of 19 March 2004 at para 295. 
43 Mettraux note 30 above at 184; Cassese note 30 above at 454.  
44 Werle note 7 above at 256.  
45 Prosecutor v Nahimana et al ICTR Case No ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement of 3 December 2003 at paras 1072-1084. The Appeals 
Chamber in the Nahimana case held that speech that incites violence against a population group on any discriminatory grounds 
constitutes actual discrimination, but that hate speech alone does not constitute a violation of fundamental rights; a speech by itself 
cannot directly kill members of a group, imprison or physically injure them. Prosecutor v Nahimana et al ICTR Case No ICTR-99-
52-A, Judgement of 28 November 2007 at para 986.  
46 Prosecutor v Krnojelac ICTY Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgement of 17 September 2003 at para 185. 
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political, racial or religious basis.47 
 
Generally, the acts underlying persecution need not be considered a crime under 
international law; 48  in fact, they need not be inherently criminal, though they may 
become criminal and persecutory if committed with discriminatory intent.49 Furthermore, 
a single omission may suffice to constitute persecution, as long as it was deliberately 
intended to discriminate. But it is not enough that there be discriminatory intent. The act 
or omission must have discriminatory consequences, which means it must be shown that 
the victim was in fact persecuted.50 This requirement exists to avoid someone being found 
guilty without anyone having been actually persecuted. 51  There are cases where the 
destruction of the property of the persecuted person in itself may not have as severe an 
effect on the victim as to amount to a crime against humanity, for example, burning the 
victims’ car, unless this results in the loss of “an indispensable and vital asset to the 
owner.”52 Similarly, destroying a cultural heritage site or places of religious worship may 
qualify as persecution where such acts have serious adverse effects on a strongly religious 
population.53 
 
These varied interpretations that the UN ad hoc tribunals have read into the meaning of 
persecution constitute a useful platform from which to start placing religious persecution 
more affirmatively within the ambit of international criminal justice. Many of the 
discriminatory and restrictive practices applied against minority (but also majority) 
religious groups or sub-groups, and the dire consequences for those affected by them, are 
real and eminently contemporary. 54 Research shows that countries that prohibit 
blasphemy, apostasy or defamation of religion tend to have more restrictions on 
religion.55 This has been found to be strikingly so in North Africa and in the Middle East, 
where governments “were twice as likely as governments worldwide to resort to physical 
force when dealing with religious groups.”56 Instances of such force included killings, 
physical abuse, imprisonment, displacement from home, or destruction of religious 
property. 57  According to Grim, Europe’s worryingly increasing social hostility to the 
growing Muslim immigrant population also harbours the potential to fuel governments to 
impose religious restrictions.58 This, in turn, could have the effect of feeding into a circle 
of social violence against religious groups, as happened in Nazi Germany and as is 
happening at present in Iraq.59 
 
                                                 
47 Prosecutor v Stanišić and Źupljanin note 42 above at para 68; Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez note 38 above at para 68; 
Prosecutor v Vasiljević ICTY Case No. IT-98-32-A, Judgement of 25 February 200 at para 113.  
48 Kvoćka et al v Prosecutor ICTY Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Judgement of 28 February 2005 at para 323. 
49 Prosecutor v Kvoćka et al ICTY Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgement of 2 November 2001 at para 186. See also Tadić case note 
34 above at para 710. 
50 Prosecutor v Vasiljević ICTY Case No.IT-98-32-A, Judgement of 25 February 2004 at para 245; Prosecutor v Krnojelac ICTY 
Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgement of September 2003 at para 432. 
51 See G. Acquaviva Forced displacement and international crimes (2011, UNHCR, PPLA/2011/05) available at 
www.unhcr.org/4e0346344.pdf  (accessed 10 September 2013). 
52 Prosecutor v Kupreškić note 35 above at para 631. 
53 Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez note 38 above at para 207. 
54 See, for example European Parliament recommendation to the Council of 13 June 2013 on the draft EU Guidelines on the 
Promotion and Protection of Freedom of Religion or Belief [2013/2082(INI)] P7_TA-PROV(2013) 0279; B.J. Grim “Rising 
restrictions on religion: context, statistics and implications” (2012) 5 IJRF 17 at 23- 25.   
55 See B.J. Grim note 54 above at 25. IJRF 17 at 25.  
56 Ibid. 27. 
57 Ibid.  
58 Ibid 32. 
59 Ibid. 32. 
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As a preliminary conclusion we can say that persecution sits, as one writer puts it, “very 
much at the core of crimes against humanity.”60 The ICTY’s jurisprudence, in particular, 
has contributed immensely to the development of our understanding of persecution as a 
crime against humanity. In fact, persecution has often been the “most analyzed specific 
act”61 in the jurisprudence of international criminal judicial bodies. But with the ICTY and 
ICTR now winding up the last cases before them in order to close shop for good, 
international crimes are now a matter of the ICC which came into existence in 2002. The 
discussion will therefore turn to the crime of humanity of persecution under the ICC 
Statute, and will expound briefly on some of the aspects of persecution which have not 
been dealt with above. 
 
4.3 Persecution as a crime against humanity under the International 
Criminal Court Statute  
Article 7(1) of the ICC Statute defines a crime against humanity as comprising those 
crimes listed in the definition that are committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack. One of the 
listed crimes is “persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity 
on…religious…grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under 
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any other 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.” 
 
This means that the acts of persecution must be connected to any of the other ten 
categories of acts enumerated in Article 7 (1), including but not limited to murder, forcible 
transfer, imprisonment, torture, persecution, enforced disappearance, and crimes of 
sexual violence – or to the crime of genocide (Article 6) and war crimes (Article 8).  
 
The ICC Statute defines persecution as “the intentional and severe deprivation of 
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or 
collectivity.”62 The perpetrator must engage in a course of conduct involving multiple acts 
which are “part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian 
population...pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit 
such an attack”.63 
 
The criterion “widespread” can be derived from the number of victims or from the 
geographic area over which the attack extends. A single act, too, can be a widespread 
attack, if it affects many civilians, for it “is the attack that must be widespread or 
systematic and not the acts of the perpetrator.”64 The word “systematic” refers to the 
organized nature of the acts and the overall action, the reason being to avoid making 
isolated acts punishable as crimes against humanity. But it is not necessary that there be a 
plan or a policy, although the existence of one would help to prove the systematic nature 
of the attack.65 
                                                 
60 W.A. Schabas The International Criminal Court: A commentary on the Rome Statute (2010, Oxford) 175. 
61 M.C. Bassiouni Crimes against humanity (2011, Cambridge) 405.   
62 Art. 7(2) (g).  
63 Art. 7(1) and 7(2) (a). 
64 C. de Than and E. Shorts International Criminal Law and Human Rights (2003, Sweet and Maxwell) 92. 
65 Prosecutor v Kunarac et al note 30 above at para 98; Prosecutor v Krstić ICTY Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgement of 19 April 




4.4 The status of the perpetrator  
Some states make no bones about the government’s resolute determination to restrict and 
severely weaken the exercising of religious freedom. Such states usually have dragnet laws 
that criminalize almost any conduct of a minority religious group. The law is enforced 
rigorously and mercilessly, and the criminal justice apparatus works in such a way that 
the accused has no chances at all of being acquitted, either because judges have a wide 
margin of discretion in interpreting a vaguely defined law, 66  or because the accused 
person has only a limited right to legal representation or to call witnesses. For example, in 
Pakistan, which has broadly defined anti-blasphemy laws, only Muslims may be attorneys 
and witnesses, and accused persons have no legal claim against those who falsely accuse 
them of blasphemy.67 
 
In cases where state officials carry out the persecutory acts, with the state looking away 
and declining to protect the individual or to prosecute those responsible, there can be 
little doubt that the state endorses such conduct, which gives effect to a state’s 
persecutory policy.68 But what liability is incurred where the persecutory act is carried out 
by a private person without authorization by the government, or by a criminal gang, a 
guerrilla group or a terrorist organization? 
 
It does not matter whether or not the perpetrator is a state official or a member of an 
organization, for any person implementing or acting in support of the policy of the state 
or organization can be held liable for the crime of persecution.69 A striking historical 
example “is the denunciation of a single Jew to the Gestapo, which was part of the process 
of excluding German Jews from cultural and economic life in the Third Reich.”70 It is not 
even necessary that the perpetrator use physical force, for the word “attack” covers any 
mistreatment of the targeted civilian population,71 and may include non-violent conduct, 
such as internment, discrimination or deportation.72 As to other non-state actors, the 
prevailing view is that if the policy element is taken into account, it is not necessary that 
the organization responsible for the persecutory policy controls or governs a particular 
geographic area; all that is required is that the group of people, regardless of whether or 
not they are an organization, have the capacity to commit a widespread or systematic 
attack on a civilian population.73 This view was recently upheld by the Trial Chamber of 
the ICC in the Kenya case when it laid down that the criterion of what constitutes an 
organisation is not “the formal nature of a group and the level of organization’, but 
whether the group “has the capability to perform acts which infringe on basic human 
values.”74 
 
5. Ending impunity – bringing the culprits to book  
The campaign against religious persecution needs to be conducted on several fronts. 
                                                 
66 See T. Arora “India’s defiance of religious freedom” (2012) 5 IJRF 59 at 63-64. 
67 A. Buwalda and G. Yogarajah “No justice for minorities in Pakistan” (2011) 4 IJRF 101 at 102. 
68 Werle note 7 above at 302.   
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid 297.  
71 Mettraux note 30 above at 157; K Ambos Internationales Strafrecht (2006, C H Beck) 212; Werle note 7 above at 297.  
72 De Than and Shorts note 64 above at 91. 
73 Ambos note 71 above at 215; Werle note 7 above 301. 
74 Kenya ICC-01/09 Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision of 31 March 2010 at para 95.  
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
11  
These range from exercising religious tolerance, expressing solidarity with the persecuted, 
engaging in inter-religious dialogue, or through to education. All these initiatives make 
ample sense, but need to be harnessed in tandem with each other, and more importantly, 
need to be reinforced with active, affirmative conduct. Tolerance, for example, requires 
more than the mere show of broad-mindedness or the capacity to endure; it requires, as 
Diana Eck has put it, to be translated in a plural society to mean “nurturing of 
constructive dialogue, revealing both common understandings and real differences.”75 
Helmut Schmidt, when he was then Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
emphasized this point in an address to Protestants in the former German Democratic 
Republic, when he said that “he who stands for tolerance must desire and seek dialogue 
with the other.”76 The critical role education can play in combating religious prejudices 
has been stressed repeatedly.77 
 
But the literature on the topic of religious persecution has largely skirted the issue of 
bringing the perpetrators to book. Thomas Schirrmacher and Thomas K. Johnson have 
rightly pointed to the need to resort to legal justice. They argue that, while mediation, 
arbitration and reconciliation must always be prioritised before resorting to the law, 
“reason demands that we be clear that going to court can be a responsible choice for 
Christians.”78 
 
Kuzmic is even more explicit when he calls on Christians “wherever and whenever 
possible” to “engage in political advocacy and the pursuit of international justice.”79 It is, 
therefore, submitted that the campaign for the right to religious freedom needs to be 
supported by strategies aimed at bringing the organs of international criminal justice to 
become more aware of how religious persecution manifests itself in its various guises. We 
need to go beyond the level of entreating persecuting governments to tolerate or to refrain 
from punishing people who are exercising their right to freedom of religion or belief. 
Freedom of religion is part of customary international law,80 which is not only a source of 
international criminal law, but also part of it.81 It is therefore binding on all states and 
individuals alike.82 Individuals can no longer hide behind the shield of state sovereignty, 
claiming personal immunity, for international criminal law ascribes criminal 
responsibility to the individual person, including an incumbent head of state.83 
 
Making religious persecution a more urgent issue of international criminal justice is 
bound to cause outrage amongst those known for their persecutory acts, but this does not 
derogate from the necessity to make it such an issue.84 The fact that the genesis and 
evolution of crimes against humanity is largely traceable to the 20th century persecution 
of religious minorities, should serve to reinforce the validity and legitimacy of the 
                                                 
75 Cited by Donnelly note 7 above at 63. 
76 H. Schmidt Religion in der Verantwortung: Gefährdungen des Friedens im Zeitalter der Globalisierung (2012, Ullstein) 106.See 
also E/CN.4/1994/79 at para 98 on the importance of intra-religious dialogue. 
77 See A/HRC/22/51 (December 2012) 18-21. 
78 “May Christians go to court?” (2011) 4 IJRF 17 at 20.   
79 Cited by C.L.Tieszen “Agonizing for you: Christian responses to religious persecution” (2009) 2 IJRF 87 at 95.   
80 K.Thames “Mechanisms for religious freedom advocacy” (2011) 4 IJRF 115 at 116. 
81 Prosecutor v Furundžija ICTY Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement of 10 December 1998 at para 227; Mettraux note 27 above 
270. 
82 Cassese note 27 above at 91. 
83 See Werle note 7 above at 40. 
84 Thames note 80 above at 117. 
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campaign against religious persecution. Introducing the criminal justice element more 
explicitly and volubly into the promotion of the right to religious freedom or belief is 
likely to spawn a new vanguard of legal scholarship on this topic which, in turn, will help 
the courts to elaborate the contours of the crime. It is therefore crucial that this theme 
become part of the agenda at international conferences, seminars and workshops 
dedicated to international criminal justice.85 
 
6. Conclusion  
Religious persecution is a matter of constant concern which continues to manifest itself in 
the present day. Traditional ways of intervening on behalf of the victims of religious 
persecution are estimable and useful, but remain limited in their effectiveness. The 
advent of international criminal law and the creation of international criminal tribunals to 
try persons accused of committing international crimes, of which the crime against 
humanity of persecution is one, reaffirms the international community’s push to hold 
individuals accountable, for crimes are committed by people and not states. The ICTY in 
particular has played a hugely important role in elaborating the definition of the crime of 
“persecution”, thereby setting legal precedents in the area of religious persecution upon 
which the ICC can draw in the future. The preliminary examination presently being 
undertaken by the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor with regard to the situation in Nigeria 
underscores the need to make more meaningful use of international criminal law to bring 
persecutors to book. 
 
However, the organs of international criminal justice do not react instinctively to 
situations; they depend on information that is brought to light through the work of NGOs, 
human rights activists, scholarly writings, the public media and on the voices of those 
who speak out vociferously against religious persecutory acts so that they are brought 
fully within the ambit and the grasp of international criminal justice. 
 
                                                 
85 See Thames note 80 above at 116-118. 
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